Whether you're for or against the EPRDF as a political party and as the party-in-charge of the current Ethiopian government, deep inside, you know that Ethiopia, at this stage, seriously needs the EPRDF. The May 2005 elections showed the world that the EPRDF lost in urban centers like Addis Ababa while gaining the majority of rural sections of Ethiopia. This is primarily due to the fact that the EPRDF has led an agro-industry economy in Ethiopia instead of pure industry led. This results into more focus on the rural sector while the urban sector is left out of the economic progress in Ethiopia. The CUD promised a modern Ethiopia, jobs for all - urban and rural dwellers - school for all and faster growth in the political and economic sectors. The urbanites believed the CUD and overwhelmingly elected them as the party-in-charge of the Addis Ababa Government, to the majority of opposition seats in parliament and to State Parliament seats mostly in Amhara State. The EPRDF won Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP States while the other left over states were won by non-EPRDF political parties - mostly regional/local political parties.
The 2005 riots and the aftermath made many realize that the CUD cannot be trusted as a government. The CUD and the majority of "diaspora politicians" have hardliner views toward the Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 and the general political structure of Ethiopia. First, they state that Article 39 is a hazard for Ethiopian unity and that it should be crossed out from the constitution. Before crossing out anything, there needs to be a parliamentary constitutional convention of both parties to work on the constitution and amending anything. But furthermore, one wonders why the CUD takes such as position against the vary article that essentially saved Ethiopia from being a swarm of independent countries. Back in 1991 when the EPRDF took power many things were going on: Ethiopians lost faith in the immediate future of Ethiopia, there was a lot of uncertain views with the arrival of the EPRDF and departure of the Derg and lastly, many ethnic groups and political parties desired more to split apart from Ethiopia than to stay as one country. It is understandable that there would be an atmosphere of fear and hopelessness after a dehumanizing government that held grip for 17 years by national campaigns such as the "Red Terror." But the significant issue of the early 1990s was how to keep Ethiopia as Ethiopia.
The constitution authors realized that without including Article 39 all the rebel groups and ethnic leaders would advocate for the dismissal of Ethiopia and the creation of many independent countries. Since this is a scary idea, the authors found it paramount to create a federal republic in which greater autonomy with be given to the ethnic groups ("Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia") through ethno-linguistic states. Even back in the 1970s some Tigray people were actually advocating that Tigray become its own country. Everyone knows that Ethiopia is not possible without Tigray, vise versa. Tigray is truly a historical bedrock, the foundation of modern day Ethiopia. Out of Tigray came Yeha, Aksum, Adwa and Abyssinia (Habasha) - modern day Ethiopia. Ethiopia is impossible without Tigray and Tigray is also impossible without Ethiopia - by the way, when Eritrea gained freedom from Ethiopia many people never knew what Eritrea was, as far as one could tell, Eritrea is probably a new sport in Africa. Even to this day, Americans I talk to don't know of Eritrea - but amazingly my maintenance worker used to work in Eritrea as part of the United States Army. I find myself introducing Eritrea to many people!
Nonetheless, I find myself occasionally flip-flopping on the Article 39 question. I believe that Article 39 should be untouchable but before it is "declared" untouchable some sections should be modified to accommodate the changing political and cultural climates of Ethiopia. The most serious threat from Article 39 I can think of is the idea of an ethnic group initiating a referendum like Eritrea's and leaving the union. This, without a doubt should be edited to state that an ethnic group could only leave with the unanimous approval of the federal parliament (which it is highly unlikely for the parliament ever okay such a request). This would, at best, create some assurance to the collective Ethiopian people, especially opposition supporters who doubt the EPRDF's "Ethiopianess." However, if it was my decision, I would simply just take that sub-article from Article 39 to give promise to the national security and integrity of Ethiopia.
The reason why I titled this article "Why Ethiopia needs the EPRDF" is because the fundamental issues that have been addressed in the last 16 years has made the EPRDF a common ground in "Ethiopianism." Why? Well, it is simple, or at least to me. The EPRDF government has the support - covert or overt - of every person in Ethiopia and abroad. If the CUD was to be elected as the ruling party in 2005 immediately the OLF and ONLF would call it a day and depart from the union. Tigrayans, fearing the re-organization of Amhara chauvinism and xenophobia, would advocate for a Republic of Tigray (which was striked down in the 1970/80s with the formation of the EPRDF). The Afar would be compelled to group with other ethnic Afar from Eritrea and Djibouti to create a country and most, if not all, of the southern ethnic groups would depart because they have deep animosity towards highlanders, especially Amhara, who, unfortunately, have a record of chauvinistic emperors. Furthermore, the CUD is already perceived as an urbanite pro-centralization political party which almost threatens most of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia and the majority of Ethiopia's 77 million who live in the rural sectors.
The EPRDF has support in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP. Other regional political parties do not support the EPRDF but have neutral relations with the EPRDF while radicals like the OLF, ONLF, EPPF, etc., have their relations with "secondary enemies of Ethiopia" as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi would like to call them (the prime minister maintains that the primary enemy of Ethiopia is poverty). The EPRDF has the overwhelming support of the rural population - which it needs to gain the governorship of Ethiopia. While the urban population is still important it only constitutes 16% of Ethiopia's population. The EPRDF is a common ground for the Ethiopian political arena. The immediate future of Ethiopia collectively looks bright and without a doubt the EPRDF or the UEDF or UEDP-Medhin will win the elections in 2010. The CUD is officially a lost cause and cannot and will not gain its "party status."
More will come.........
9 comments:
Samuel Gebru said
:The EPRDF is a common ground for the Ethiopian political arena. The immediate future of Ethiopia collectively looks bright and without a doubt the EPRDF or the UEDF or UEDP-Medhin will win the elections in 2010. The CUD is officially a lost cause and cannot and will not gain its "party status.""
Did Meles send you this letter?
Didn't you say Siye needs to go free blah,blah,blah!
How come you did not post it?
...is it because...
"I should not have spent a day in jail, let alone six years," he told Fortune.
In his first brief interview he gave to Fortune since his detention, Seeye questioned the independence of the judiciary, although acknowledged that the judicial system has also "created strong judges". He paid tribute to former judges such as Birtukan Mideksa, who had granted his release on bail six years ago and now behind bars as one of the CUD leaders, Friehiwot Samuel and Michael Meshesha.
"I've seen and learn a lot about the supremacy of the law and judicial independence in this country," Seeye told Fortune. "Better than any time before, I've come to learn that these are important milestones for a country whether you are in business or politics."
Addisfortune.com
What is EPRDF?
E xtremely
P overty
R idden
D ysfunctional
F ederation
Yes! "Ethiopia is EPRDF"
Freedom in the World - Country Report on Ethiopia (2007)
Population: 74,800,000
Capital: Addis Ababa
Political Rights Score: 5
Civil Liberties Score: 5
Status: Partly Free
Trend Arrow
Ethiopia received a downward trend arrow due to government repression of opposition protests.
Overview
In 2006, Ethiopia coped with the aftermath of disputed 2005 parliamentary elections, which saw a significant increase in the opposition vote, but which maintained the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in power. In the wake of the elections, more than 100 opposition leaders and civil society figures went on trial for alleged capital offenses, and the government further restrained the print media. Poor climatic conditions and the prospect of renewed violence with Eritrea over a long-running border dispute were also major issues of concern during the year. Meanwhile, late in the year Ethiopia sent troops into Somalia, which routed Islamist groups that had de facto controlled parts of the country.
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One of the few African countries to avoid European colonization during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ethiopia ended a long tradition of monarchy in 1974, when Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in a Marxist military coup. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam subsequently established a brutal dictatorship that was overthrown by a coalition of guerrilla groups, with leadership from the northern Tigray region, in 1991. Those groups were spearheaded by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), itself an alliance of five parties, and EPRDF leader Meles Zenawi headed the country’s new regime as interim president.
The EPRDF government oversaw a transition period that resulted in the emergence of democratic institutions and a new constitution in 1995. In May 2000 national elections, the EPRDF won a landslide victory over a weak and divided opposition, after which Parliament elected Meles to a second five-year term as prime minister. Opposition parties and some observers criticized the government’s conduct of the vote, stating that the polls were subject to government interference, that media coverage was significantly tilted in the EPRDF’s favor, and that opposition supporters were subjected to harassment and detention. However, the opposition was able to engage in some criticism of the government in the media during the official election campaign, and a series of unprecedented public debates were broadcast over state-run radio and television.
A dispute over the border with neighboring Eritrea resulted in open warfare from 1998 until 2000. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), a mediating body, was established in the wake of the bloody conflict to draw a new border. It announced its decision in April 2002, laying out a boundary that assigned the town of Badme to Eritrea. The commission’s judgments were supposed to be binding on both sides, but Ethiopia has continued to formally reject the EEBC decision.
The May 2005 elections for the powerful lower house of Parliament resulted in a major increase in opposition representation. The EPRDF and its allies won 327 seats, while the two main opposition parties took 161 seats, up from 12 seats in the previous Parliament. The governing coalition also won elections for eight of nine regional parliaments. Notwithstanding their significant gains, opposition parties argued that interference and fraud in the electoral process had deprived them of outright victory. Street demonstrations led to violence, excessive use of government force, and widespread arrests. Security forces killed 42 people and wounded more than 60 others. More than 4,000 people were arrested, including leading opposition figures, who were charged with capital offenses. The government subsequently imposed a ban on demonstrations in the capital and, in September, arrested additional opposition supporters.
In 2006, reverberations from the disputed parliamentary elections continued. Over 100 of the jailed opposition leaders, human rights activists and journalists went on trial in February, charged with crimes ranging from “outrages against the constitution and constitutional order” to treason and attempted genocide. Amnesty International considers the defendants to be “prisoners of conscience, imprisoned solely on account of their nonviolent opinions and activities.”
Guerrilla activity by the Oromo Liberation Front and other groups continued amid government intimidation of regime opponents, especially in the Oromo-dominated southern region. Scores of ethnic Oromos, especially students, were arrested in late 2005 and early 2006. The prospect of renewed violence with Eritrea was also a major source of concern during the year. Separately, Ethiopia sent troops into neighboring Somalia to protect its UN-backed transitional government from an Islamist militia that was increasing its control over parts of the country. By year’s end these forces were poised to take control of Mogadishu, the Somali capital.
Because Ethiopia’s economy depended on a fragile agricultural sector, the threat of drought and famine remained a potential source of instability in 2006.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Ethiopia is not an electoral democracy, but the presence of a significant elected opposition as of 2005 does mark a potential step forward in the development of the country’s democratic political culture. In addition to fraud claims by the opposition, the European Union and other observers stated that the 2005 elections did not meet international standards. However, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, who led a team of observers at the polls, concluded that despite serious problems—including faulty voter-registration lists and significant administrative irregularities—the balloting essentially represented the will of the Ethiopian people.
The 2005 national election was the third since 1991. Previous elections included polling for local officials (1992), a Constituent Assembly (1994), and both regional and national legislatures (1995 and 2000). These resulted in allegations from opposition parties and civil society groups of major irregularities, including unequal access to media, biased election officials, lack of transparent procedures, a flawed election law, and a partisan National Electoral Board.
The country’s legislature is bicameral, consisting of a 108-seat upper house, the House of Federation, and a 547-seat lower house, the House of People’s Representatives. The lower house is filled through popular elections, while the upper chamber is selected by the state legislatures. Lawmakers in both houses serve five-year terms. Executive power is vested in a prime minister, who is chosen by the House of People’s Representatives. The 1995 constitution has a number of unique features, including a federal structure that grants certain powers and the right of secession to ethnically based states. However, the reality differs from what is constitutionally mandated, as the right of the people to select their government is seriously limited in practice. In 2003, the central government acquired additional powers to intervene in states’ affairs when public security is deemed to be at risk.
More than 60 legally recognized political parties are currently active in Ethiopia, but the political scene continues to be dominated by the EPRDF. While some opposition parties argue that their ability to function is seriously impeded by government harassment, observers note that opposition parties have at times failed to comport themselves in a fashion consistent with a democratic political culture.
Ethiopia was ranked 130 out of 163 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index. The government has taken a number of initiatives to limit corruption, but it has also been accused of participating in corrupt practices.
The news media are dominated by state-owned broadcasters and government-oriented newspapers. Opposition and civic organizations criticize slanted news coverage. A number of privately owned newspapers exist, but they struggle to remain financially viable and face intermittent government harassment. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 18 journalists are jailed for their work in Ethiopia. Three are serving lengthy sentences, while others are on trial for antistate crimes, and could face the death penalty if convicted. In its world press freedom review covering 2005, the International Press Institute specifically cites the Ethiopian government as failing to respect press freedom.
Press freedom groups have criticized a draft press law, saying it would further chill the media environment; the law was not enacted in 2005, but, in October 2006, the government said it would reintroduce it. The legislation includes restrictions on who may practice journalism; government-controlled licensing and registration systems; harsh sanctions for violations of the law, including up to five years’ imprisonment; excessively broad exceptions to the right to access information held by public authorities; and the establishment of a government-controlled press council with powers to engage in prior censorship. In addition, cross-ownership of newspapers and FM radio stations would not be permitted. In 2006, licenses were awarded to two private FM stations in the capital. There is extremely limited internet usage, confined mainly to major urban areas.
Constitutionally mandated religious freedom is generally respected, although religious tensions have risen in recent years. The Ethiopian Coptic Church is influential, particularly in the north. In the south there is a large Muslim community, made up mainly of Arabs, Somalis, and Oromos.
Academic freedom is restricted. In recent years, student strikes to protest police brutality and various government policies have led to scores of deaths and injuries and hundreds of arrests. Student grievances include perceived government repression of the Oromo ethnic group. Many students were killed, injured, or arrested during protests against the May 2005 election results.
Freedoms of assembly and association are limited. A number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active, but they are generally reluctant to energetically discuss issues and advocate policies that may bring them into conflict with the government. A draft NGO law, which the government said it would introduce into Parliament during the current session includes a provision permitting the government to arbitrarily close NGOs at any time, and is opposed by much of the civil society sector. In addition, in October the Ministry of Justice announced that it had established a new system enabling it to more closely regulate NGO activities.
According to the Workers’ Group of the International Labor Organization (ILO), severe restrictions on the rights of trade unions exist in Ethiopia. The labor laws authorize only one trade union in companies employing more than 20 workers. Government workers in “essential industries,” a term that is broadly defined, are not allowed to strike. The Confederation of Ethiopian Unions is under government control. The law governing trade unions states that a trade organization may not act in an overtly political manner. Some union leaders have been removed from their elected offices or forced to leave the country. All unions must be registered, but the government retains the authority to cancel union registration.
The judiciary is officially independent, though there are no significant examples of decisions at variance with government policy. The efficacy of police, judicial, and administrative systems at the local level is highly uneven. Some progress has been made in reducing a significant backlog of court cases. Human Rights Watch issued a report in 2006 stating that the Ethiopian government used intimidation, arbitrary detentions and excessive force in rural areas in the wake of election-related protests. In 2006, the government announced its intention to submit two antiterrorism bills to Parliament; one deals with the prevention and control of terrorist acts, while the second seeks to combat money laundering and the provision of financial support to terrorists.
The government has tended to favor Tigrayan ethnic interests in economic and political matters. Politics within the EPRDF have been dominated by the Tigrayan People’s Democratic Front. Discrimination against and repression of other groups, especially the Oromo, have been widespread.
The government recently established a women’s affairs ministry, and the Parliament has passed legislation designed to protect women’s rights in a number of areas. In practice, however, women’s rights are routinely violated. Women have traditionally had few land or property rights, especially in rural areas, where there is little opportunity for female employment beyond agricultural labor. Violence against women and social discrimination are reportedly common. Societal norms and limited infrastructure prevent many women from seeking legal redress for their grievances. While illegal, the kidnapping of women and girls for marriage continues in parts of the country. General deficiencies in education exacerbate the problems of rural poverty and gender inequality. According to Save the Children, Ethiopia has one of the lowest rates of school enrollment in sub-Saharan Africa.
Renata Elad
Thanks to an earlier post on What is EPRDF? I'm going to use that on all my posts and make it known.
E xtremely
P overty
R idden
D ysfunctional
F ederation
READ THE ABOVE ARTICLE!
Amen to that!!
i like your post young man. ethiopia was surely in a terrible position to survive in the 1990s. the current constitution should take some credit. but i doubt that even EPRDF would tolerate any separatist politicians to exercise the article. actually i believe EPRDF is equaly as centralist as CUD. the difference is what they are "centering" on. they are both pro-ethiopia, even though TPLF is still suspected with its REPublic of Tigray manifesto. the best way to cure such distrust should be a public acknowledgment from TPLF that is has completely left its old manifesto.
anyway very nice article and i like your parliamentary majority idea on seccession. if you go this way and change your blind support for TPLF, you would be a great future prime minister.
About the election:
-if you want to be factual, you should have said not that CUD won Addis but almost all the places with observers.
Those who studied statistics know what that mean...But leave it there.The only conclusion you can draw is that elections are irrelevant in ethiopia for the composition of the ruling group.All the rest is speculation, propaganda or simple ignorance about politics.
C= Chauvinists
U= United (for)
D= Derg
loooooooooooooooool
update your map you ignorant imbecile. This is 2008, Eritrea has been independent for 16 years now.
You guys just never learn...
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